Do Free Markets Create Free Societies? by Krislov, Samuel
DO FREE MARKETS CREATE FREE SOCIETIES? 
Samuel Krislov• 
INTRODUCTION 
The notion that markets lead to law and freedom is said to have 
originated in Adam Smith's work and rooted in history. Both the pro-
gression and roots seem highly problematic. Neo-Smithian approaches 
have been refurbished by general acceptance of a contingent nature of 
the relation. They have also been enhanced by the failures of European 
Marxist economics in ways predicted with uncanny accuracy. On the 
other hand, neo-classical claims of democratic welfare system were 
only a step away from similar failures, which have been refuted. 
Hopes that an international system might impose democracy from 
outside the nation-state are overly optimistic. Nationalism is rife, with a 
continuing outburst of ethnic secessions, and little yielding of power to 
supra-national decision-makers. 
The greatest success of supra-national authority has been in creat-
ing subsidiary structures, unlikely to implement fundamental transfor-
mation, but with potential for supporting such a thrust. These include 
expert-based operations, and the network ofNGOs. 
I. THE BASICS 
In a nebulous way, the relations between efficiency, law, and free-
dom have been explored by social scientists in a unified field theory, a 
social "theory of everything" analogous to Hawkins' description of 
"Einstein's unfulfilled legacy to physics." While attempts by physicists 
to link concepts are overt, attempts by social scientist have been more 
obscure due to many factors. 
Few social scientists have identical definitions and many use terms 
in ways inconsistent with their own definitions. Many definitions are 
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essentially contested concepts-ideological terms used by writers pre-
ordaining the outcome of their inquiries. There is also an almost irre-
sistible tendency to confuse the social and individual levels of analysis 
on such matters, so that a factor appears in many guises making cause 
and effect difficult to disentangle. No doubt there are other difficulties. 
II. EARLY EFFORTS: SMITH AND NEO-CLASSIC MARKET THEORIES 
The font of many such theories is Adam Smith's masterpiece, The 
Wealth of Nations. 1 While that work is esteemed more for its shrewd 
observations and brilliant writing than for its analytic precision or con-
sistency, it links efficiency (laissez faire - the market) to the wealth of 
nations. The object of society, however, is not mere wealth, but "natu-
ral liberty."2 The linkage is not clear. But good laws, free trade, 
wealth, and natural liberty are lodestones. 
In Smith's discussion law seems an independent variable, and a 
condition for efficiency and wealth, though that is not a clear specifica-
tion. "Natural liberty" is a criterion, that as for contract theorists of his 
time both precedes and continues to operate as a bright line test of gov-
ernmental power. Nonetheless, the traditional neo-Smithian view as-
sumes that market efficiency generates law, and law leads to a free soci-
ety. This seems to me historically anachronistic and not a good reading 
of Smith, but it is a possible interpretation. 
The nineteenth century and most of the twentieth were not propi-
tious years for Smithian theorists. As a practical matter most European 
countries accepted the logic (and political advantage) of the great soci-
ety as a social insurer providing safety nets (and more) to its less well-
off citizens. Indeed it can be argued that Continental Europe passed 
from mercantilist to welfare policies, while using laissez faire as a slo-
gan to eliminate only egregious regulatory schemes. 
"Efficiency" was not, as promised by devotees of "the invisible 
hand," automatically available. Economists wrote of "third party costs" 
and "market failures." While Smith used the term "monopoly" mainly 
in his era's sense of an exclusive governmental license, economists dis-
covered "natural monopolies"-e.g. most public utilities-that drasti-
cally distorted markets or controlled them. The law had moved to allow 
limited liability companies and they did not act like individuals in their 
markets. Economic influence was not the same as "one player, one 
vote." Combinations of corporations (collusions in Smith's terms) were 
1. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (P. F. Collier & Son 1902)(1776). 
2. JACOB VINER, ESSAYS ON INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF ECONOMICS 85-113 (1991). 
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rendered easier to come by and to enforce. 
The notion of efficiency of the market has also had redefinition 
among Smithian free market advocates, particularly of the Austrian-
Chicago school of thinkers. That school continues to admirably com-
bine technical proficiency with sociological and political insight in the 
tradition of political economy and to emphasize "natural freedom" or 
some equivalent as the crown jewel of that quest. Those following 
Frank Knight have argued for a more subtle definition of "efficiency." 
They recognize the failings of the market and its inadequacies. Still it is 
not only usually superior to political decision-making in its ability to 
summarize economic processes; it also frees political processes from a 
burden it cannot handle. Politics overwhelms freedom when too many 
of the allocations of social resources are politicized. Politics also in-
vites snowballing coercion to assure success of governmental processes. 
The market preserves and protects the political process by limiting its 
range. And so long as the market produces a reasonably efficient solu-
tion, it should be maximized as a decision-maker.3 So there is a strong 
presumption in favor of decentralized decision-making, enforced by 
monetary consequences rather than state coercion. The force of this 
logic has been strengthened by the failures of the Sovietized Eastern 
European experiments. 
In recent decades Kenneth Arrow and Joseph Stiglitz have demon-
strated what most have long suspected. The conditions for a pure free 
market seldom exist and small departures from that purity can produce 
large inequities.4 But the Knight approach inoculates against such 
flaws. The market is good enough when buttressed by its helping hand 
to the polity, and its emphasis on contract rather than legal coercion. 
Ill. THE MARXIST SOLUTION 
Marx essentially rejected any linkage of all these terms, and indeed 
argued against their essential validity. "The market" enshrined anti-
human values and did not work. "Law" was a conceptual fetish, de-
signed to fool the workers. Freedom was indefinable and could only 
emerge from the destruction of existing social restraints. It would then 
be complete and not dependent on either economic or legal constraints. 
The Marxist logical system treated all these terms as "process" notions 
requiring elaborate vocabularies and little concrete manifestations. 
3. FRANK H. KNIGHT, FREEDOM AND REFORM ( 194 7). 
4. ADAM PRZEWORSKI, The Neolibera/ Fallacy, in CAPITALISM SOCIALISM AND 
DEMOCRACY REVISITED 39-53 (Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner eds., 1993). 
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Non-Marxists found this empty verbiage. They taunted Marxists 
with a powerful conundrum. If the market is abolished, what replaces 
it? If administrators make decisions about production and distribution 
what do they base those decisions on? 
That challenge was, in principle, answered by Oskar Lange, a Pol-
ish Marxist with a political career, and Abba Lerner, a moderate social-
ist economics professor. Essentially as Lange formulated it, the market 
can be viewed as a set of equations with needs requiring other basic 
goods. 5 Planners could use an input-output matrix or similar calcula-
tions to learn how to adjust social needs to achieve a solution of these 
complex equations, and thus "clear the market." Indeed much of this 
work was similar to a classical conceptualization of the market by Leon 
W alras. Socialists could build into their scheme additional corrective 
market prices where parts of the market were maintained. 
While the intellectual theory of a socialist substitute for the market 
is rich and elegant, it is doubtful even today with our vast array of high-
speed computers that this program is capable of even rudimentary im-
plementation. As we shall note below the Eastern bloc countries had 
conferences on the intellectual theories, but in practice relied on cruder, 
simpler, politically driven and largely ineffectual methods to produce 
their failed economies. 
IV. THE WELFARE STATE 
A more piecemeal approach was that of the welfare economists, 
like Alfred Marshall and Arthur Cecil Pigou. They suggested specific 
policies could be evaluated in terms of auditing costs and benefits and 
followed when benefits outweighed costs. So environmental regula-
tions could calculate the effects of London smog on medical bills, dry 
cleaning, dusting homes and streets, and loss of earnings. And these 
savings could be used to offset e.g. scrubbers on smoke stacks. But 
Lionel Robbins-not unsympathetic to the social purpose-argued per-
suasively that most decisions involve assigning monetary sums to other 
preferences are not really so calculable. 6 A death in the family may be 
calculated at the basics of lifetime earnings expectations, but different 
heirs may regard that sum as trivial and insulting, or a good deal. 
The neoclassic insistence on individual and unique utility functions 
are often modified by such solutions as Vilfredo Pareto optimality-
5. ERNESTO SCREPANTI AND STEFANO ZAMAGNI, AN OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF 
ECONOMIC THOUGHT 274-78 (David Field trans., 1993). 
6. Id. at 269-71. 
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where everyone improves or does not suffer from the new situation-
but that is a much more constrained domain for welfare economics. 
Furthermore, even on the question of compensation in any of these pol-
icy situations-the actual criterion is the Kaldor-Hicks solution where 
optimality is accepted if sufficient compensation is self-generated by the 
new policy.7 
V. SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY INFLUX 
In the emerging field of sociological theory a more sweeping chal-
lenge was developing. While there were important social Darwinist so-
cial philosophers like Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner, 
most emphasis was more on societal or group forms. Emile Durkheim 
emphasized "social solidarity" and those "moral sentiments" that Smith 
emphasized in his first major work but relegated to the back-benches in 
the Wealth of Nations.8 Weber found in social norms and bureaucratic 
structures, major forces for innovation and creativity, creators and not 
mere sideshows for economic growth. 9 And there were other important 
figures, besides these giants who reconceptualized law and government 
as more than necessary evils. Perhaps the most significant of these was 
Claude-Henri de Saint-Simon who was the precursor of Marxism, tech-
nocratic and entrepreneurial approaches. In any event, economics and 
sociology tended to have distinctly different attitudes about social costs 
of the use and non-use of law as an instrument for change and social en-
richment. 
As important as these redefinitions of the variables of efficiency 
and law were, they were all dwarfed in effectiveness by a simple redefi-
nition of the term "liberty" which accompanied a sea of change in think-
ing about that concept. The new "liberty" was formulated by T .H. 
Green, an Oxford Hegelian ~hilosopher who argued that a new focus on 
"freedom" was necessary. 1 To that end, he distinguished between 
"negative" and "positive" freedom. The old liberty was freedom from 
governmental infringement of "basic" rights and freed the individual to 
utilize the absence of restraint to assert individuality. Property (as an 
extension of self) was the major means to achieve this sense of expres-
7. See generally ROBERT A. DAHL AND CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS ECONOMICS & 
WELFARE (1953); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 91-95 (1983). 
8. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD (George E.G. Catlin ed., 
Sarah A. Solovay and John H. Mueller trans., Chicago University Press 1938) (1895). 
9. MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY (H.H. Gerth and C. Wright 
Mills trans., eds., 1953). 
10. CRANE BRINTON, Thomas H. Green, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES vol. 7, 164-65 (Edwin R.A. Seligman and Alvin Johnson eds. 1932). 
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sive humanity in John Locke's seminal presentation. Green argued that 
the modem world grated more on human potentiality and required more 
than just the absence of restraint. Since the state is superior to any 
amalgam of individuals, it must foster the best in each of them. The 
new, positive freedom involved freedom to be and achieve. 
The "new liberty" was less formal and less constrained by histori-
cal forms, and therefore somewhat nebulous and unbounded. Indeed, 
the boundary between its offspring the "welfare state" and socialism is 
to critics of both the "new freedom" and the welfare society, not a 
boundary but a slippery slope. 
But the new terminology has been effective and its influence per-
suasive, in part because of its realism. The power of the argument did 
not flow from the brilliance of Green's discussion-it is turgid and 
plodding-but from a felt erosion, a decline in personal efficacy, of the 
individual. 
Welfare statists of the new liberal and democratic socialist variety 
also found themselves in a peculiar relationship with the technocrats, a 
social approach that was on a different plane than traditional left-right 
differences. These "industrial engineers" or "scientific managers" es-
poused a more dirigiste approach to efficiency and called for centralized 
control over "inefficient" competition. While ambivalent about law and 
democratic control of industrial policy they regarded law as a means of 
taming the excesses of capitalist competition. Technocrats and welfare 
liberals were uneasy yoke mates, for example, in Franklin Roosevelt's 
New Deal, with the President's first term dominated by technocrats like 
Rexford Tugwell and centralized programs like National Industrial Re-
covery Act (NIRA), while the second term saw social welfare liberals of 
the Brandeis school predominate. At least some technocrats viewed 
W estem structured economics as a democratic parallel to Nazi and Rus-
sian Communist managerial control. I I As World War II approached 
welfare statists began to view their communist and technocratic poten-
tial allies with suspicion, questioning both their ideological affinities 
and the political consequences of their partnerships. 
VI. THE EASTERN EUROPEAN MARXIST STATES 
The decade following World War II seemingly marked a high 
point for non-capitalist systems. The Soviet Union took over territory 
and installed regimes under its total control throughout Eastern Europe 
as far west as the East German "People's" Republic. 
11. See generally JAMES BURNHAM, THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION ( 1941 ). 
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But in fact, as George Kennan noted at the time, the system was al-
ready in decay. That decay was partly a practical one-neither the eco-
nomic well-being nor the liberty of people was being served. And it 
was also an intellectual and spiritual one. People noticed and once-
fervid communists were voicing powerful critiques of the system that 
promised so much, only to produce Stalinism. 
When all was said and done the gravemen of the analysis was that 
the combination of economic monopoly and political authority was not 
as Marx suggested of incidental importance, and especially not a step 
toward freedom. It was a dominant and menacing factor that was de-
structive of all of the key elements of social life. 
The notion that concentrated powers led to synergistic evils was 
given pungency by the publication of Milovan Djilas' s The New 
Class. 1 Tito's right-hand man in the Yugoslavian regime-a commu-
nist system that prided itself both on its fierce independence from Sta-
lin, and on its nominally decentralized economy based on "voluntary 
cooperatives"-Djilas nonetheless saw it as fundamentally coercive and 
repressive. In a remarkable demonstration of conscience, he denounced 
the system and smuggled out his analysis of its flaws. He was, inevita-
bly jailed but his logic led even the official Soviet theorists to accept the 
notion of "strata," and that appartchniks controlling (though not own-
ing) means of production were one such "stratum." 
The Lange-Lerner-Arrow and Leo Hurwicz findings in theoretical 
terms were, in practice, not merely unworkable; they bore little if any 
resemblance to what was attempted by the planners. In practice, fun-
damental decisions by the ruling groups preceded and dominated any 
economic calculations at all, as Fredrich Hayek argued it would. 13 
Those policy considerations often had little or no relation to any eco-
nomic reality. Mao's vision that production of steel would lead to in-
dustrial greatness, meant that the Chinese landscape was forever 
changed as sparse trees in semi-arid areas were cut down to melt old 
iron statues, producing little steel, and much ecological and cultural 
damage. The premise, of at least doubtful merit, was based on Mao's 
power, not his grasp of equations. The Soviet economic system, far 
from controlling waste by intricate planning to produce the right mix of 
raw and semi-finished products often had factories paralyzed by ab-
sence of one or more sub-products-say perhaps-screws. Since fail-
ure to produce left managers at risk not only for their jobs, but also at 
12. See generally MILOVAN DJILAS, THE NEW CLASS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE COMMUNIST 
SYSTEM (1957). 
13. See generally FREDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944). 
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times for their lives, production numbers, not quality, dominated. 
In short, neither short-term gain nor future-oriented investment was 
protected. "Production for social purposes" was the slogan and efficient 
productivity was not measured or valued in meaningful ways. The 
Eastern bloc failed miserably in the economic sphere. Its lack of pro-
ductivity meant that even in those few areas where social humanism 
dominated distributional principles there was little to distribute. 
VII. LAW AND RUSSIAN MARXISM 
Marx and Engels had postulated that law was a fa9ade, an instru-
ment of the ruling class administered by the state, itself a mask for 
bourgeois power. The end of class structure doomed the capitalist state. 
It was, famously, not "abolished, it withered away." Further details 
were not provided. 14 
The leading Soviet legal theorist Pashukanis, drew the seemingly 
orthodox conclusion that as goods ceased to be burdened with owner-
ship considerations and classes disappeared, law, would in parallel fash-
ion, also wither away. Unfortunately for him, this logical progression 
was seen by Stalin as a form of criticism, and supporting Bukharin's so-
called right deviations which Stalin denounced in 1929. Realizing he 
was in trouble, Pashukanis admitted to mistakes in his work, but this did 
not save him. In 193 7 he was denounced as an enemy of the people 
"and a miserable theorist." As Stalin explained, the socialist state 
would become stronger, not weaker, en route to its withering. "Is this 
contradictory?" Yes, it is "contradictory" ... but it completely reflects 
Marxist dialectics." (A less "theoretical" formulation was later added 
that a more formidable workers state was necessitated by "capitalist en-
circlement.") Pashukanis disappeared and his exact fate is unknown. 15 
Soviet theorists claimed-and convinced some scholars, most no-
tably the venerable Rene David16-that theirs was a distinctive type of 
law, on a par with civil law or common law families. The distinctive 
features claimed were (1) the virtually complete end to property and 
contract litigation; (2) the emergence of separate Arbritrazh courts, 
14. KARL R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 128 (4th ed. 1963) (Ingen-
iously suggests the "withering away" concept might have been more a political slogan than 
a thought-out principle. By using it, Marx and Engels out-flanked Bakunin and the anar-
chists.). 
15. See generally V.I. LENIN ET AL., SOVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (Hugh w. Babb trans., 
1951 ); see also HUGH COLLINS, MARXISM AND LA w 1982. 
16. RENE DAVID AND JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD 
TODA y (2nd ed. 1968). 
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which dealt with conflicts between large state enterprises; (3) a new 
humanistic approach to criminal law; ( 4) "comrade," "peoples," or 
"neighborhood" courts, which substituted fresh constructive guidance 
by co-workers or neighbors for cold-hearted formalistic bourgeois ab-
stractions; ( 5) and most distinctively, the substitution of "socialist-
legality" for law, a sub-situation that enabled judges to favor "social 
purpose" and even to negate explicit black-letter law if to follow the 
law as "fetish" produced an undesired result. 
Today few-if any-find these claims worthy of consideration. 
The claims of "peoples law" and "socialist legality" were the significant 
ones, but were largely hoaxes. 17 The "peoples law" efforts-
community and factory courts-seldom were constructive, partly be-
cause political control was the obvious subtext. Additionally the system 
enabled the neighborhood or workplace bully to exercise power, includ-
ing the initial denunciation to the authorities. "Socialist legality" was 
also largely a fa9ade, for the discretion nominally given judges was in 
fact exercised by party leaders. Judges would notoriously adjourn pro-
ceedings when their phones rang in chambers, to get instructions, sel-
dom socialist, that generally had little or no relation to legality.18 
The failures of legal order was the other face of the absence of lib-
erty. Stalin and Lenin's Russia rivaled Nazi Germany in brutality and 
probably exceeded it in numbers killed, with the added distinction of 
wreaking havoc on its own people. Particularly damning was the crude 
smearing of comrades-in-arms who fell out of favor. Not content with 
taking their lives and often extending punishment to their families, the 
Eastern European regimes-and communist China-typically accused 
deposed leaders as traitors, vermin and the like. By so doing, they 
maximized fear and fatalism, emphasizing everyone's liberty was 
ephemeral and unprotected. 
VIII. THE SURVIVAL BUT SHRINKAGE OF THE WELFARE STATE 
Almost parallel to the rise and fall of the "Soviet empire," the wel-
fare state experienced heady expansion after World War II, only to find 
it had over-reached its ability to deliver on its promises. Its decline, 
though, has seen careful pruning, rather than collapse. While some con-
servatives suggest that the failures of communism, democratic social-
ism, and liberal welfare systems are of the same cloth, the survival 
17. SAMUEL KRISLOV, The Concept of Families of Law, in LEGAL SYSTEMS AND SOCIAL 
SYSTEMS 25-38 (Adam Podgorecki, Christopher J. Whelan & Dinesh Khosla eds. 1985). 
18. GORDON B. SMITH, REFORMING THE RUSSIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 68, 109, 143 (1996) 
(gives figures on the extent of "telephone justice"). 
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power of truncated welfare states suggest something quite different. 
The reach of democratic socialist systems has varied both in scope 
and time span. Sweden's preceded World War II and largely avoided 
nationalization. Britain' s was more far-reaching in its nationalization of 
the economy. All of the West European systems had historic experi-
ence with some degree of a mixed economy. All proceeded in the 
1940s and 1950s with slow expansion of welfare capitalism, most with 
an eye toward achieving something less than total governmental control 
of the economy. None of them had aspirations for total planning and 
therefore avoided the non-market price-fixing dilemmas of the Marxist 
states. 
Those that nationalized industries followed the path of controlling 
the "commanding heights" of the economy; steel production, coal, en-
ergy, transportation, and a lesser degree, finance. The investments in 
coal and steel were historic misjudgments, as those industries' crucial 
role of the moment was beginning to be eclipsed in part because of new 
Asian competition. 
British nationalization of steel and coal was a particularly disas-
trous step, for it also presented the Labor Party, with its heavy commit-
ment to organized labor unions, with political as well as economic 
headaches. The Labor Party was whipsawed by union demands: if it 
agreed to them it lost middle-of-the-road voters, but denial of claims 
threatened its base. 
Labor's strategic error in investing in wasting industries and cling-
ing to them for political and ideological reasons helped Margaret 
Thatcher to gain political power and undo much of the nationalization 
program. Denationalization of coal and steel was spectacularly success-
ful. Privatization of local transportation and the airlines seems to have 
worked, but railroad privatization toted as promoting increased invest-
ment was followed by neglect and a spectacular rise in the accident rate. 
By and large, the Blair years have seen no appetite to undo the signifi-
cant Thatcher-Major denationalizations, a tacit concession of the ineffi-
ciencies of much of the socialist program. 
In the same vein, Thatcher only nibbled at the fringes of the wel-
fare state tacitly acknowledging its political power. The crowning 
jewel, the National Health Service, was already modified by co-
payments and other attempts to control the realities of hypochondria and 
misuse of free goods. The Conservatives were keen on further limits on 
health and other benefits rather more as slogans than policies. Resur-
gent labor invested more funds with phlegmatic results but the Conser-
vative Party's stance that it could do more with less-has not impressed 
the electorate. 
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Continental socialism had less to systematically divest-since it 
nationalized less systematically, and had the cover of the European Un-
ion as it evolved toward free market of Europe. The privatization of en-
ergy systems and auto manufacturing has been country-by-country 
rather than programmatic or European Community (EC) sponsored. 
Transportation, too, has slowly moved back into the private sphere. 
But on the continent, too, welfare protection has been cut back, 
though seldom threatened in principle. Some of the more extreme theo-
ries of entitlement-for addicts, systematic subsidization of alleged art, 
bountiful unemployment benefits-have paralleled cuts in such benefits 
in the private sector including curtailment of mandated benefits. This 
readjustment is a minimalist recognition of the limits imposed by eco-
nomic realities. 
Because, as Peter Berger has noted,19 none of the Western welfare 
states ever attempted a total socialist economy, they experienced rela-
tively few of the problems of measurement associated with controlled 
administrative pricing. Not only did some of those countries retain 
competitive enterprises, they also had similar products as well as im-
ports which permitted comparisons. Of course, in socialist Western 
Europe state enterprises kept balance sheets-of various transparency-
and posted profits and losses. The rapid disintegration of the national-
ized sector represents a judgment based on these experiences. In indus-
tries such as coal and steel, the inefficiencies were inherent in the deci-
sion to acquire a wasting enterprise. But political management was also 
not as adept at pruning, discarding, and reformulating as private enter-
prise, aided by governmental pulls and shoves. 
In short, government operations of newer enterprises were mostly 
failures, and privatization largely (though often marginally) more suc-
cessful, with some clear triumphs. However, privatization also had a 
number of failures. Free-marketers have concluded that this record un-
equivocally supplements the conclusion from the Eastern Europe fias-
cos that private companies always do better, though the Western Euro-
pean record is spottier than that. 
The trimming of welfare benefits also came from escalation in use 
and costs. The public in most countries supported curtailment of bene-
fits (and sometimes classes of beneficiaries) but generally turned again 
to welfarist parties after a conservative cleansing. While the trimming 
of benefits is also seen by free marketers as a retreat on the way to a 
19. CAPITALISM SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY REVISITED 3 (Larry Diamond & Marc F. 
Planter eds., 1993). 
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rout, welfarists see it as a prudent regrouping. In many instances leftish 
coalitions have taken the corrective steps to save the underlying system; 
in others they have refrained from reversing the cuts made after losing 
elections. 
From a political standpoint this suggests that Hayek's 1944 projec-
tion of a "road to serfdom," is simply yet another "slippery slope" catas-
trophe theory with little behind it. Both pure welfare states and ones 
into nationalization have demonstrated the political will and clear free-
dom to reverse any process where economically required and politically 
desired. Hayek argued that willy-nilly welfarists would emerge as ob-
jective Bolsheviks suppressing dissent and tightening governmental 
control. 
But welfare state countries show little signs of marching away 
from freedom. To the contrary: in spite of considerable controls over 
personal transfers of funds and other severe regulations for taxing pur-
poses, they manage to preserve even economic liberty at a high level. 
Their emphasis on personal rights is even more profoundly respected 
throughout the world, and has not been drastically altered since Hayek 
wrote sixty years ago. On the whole, their feet are firmly planted in an 
enduring tradition of personal freedoms and they are on no road to a dif-
ferent end. 
IX. DEVELOPMENT AND FREEDOM 
Only Korea and Taiwan have followed the idealized pattern of 
moving from a market system to law-constrained economy to robust 
freedom, joining Japan and India as manifestations of Asian democracy 
and free expression. (India's ethos is quite deviant, reflecting its British 
colonial past. But many other colonies have generally repudiated their 
democratic legacy.) What is interesting is that these two societies are 
hardly the ones that would have been projected by market theorists. 
Their perennial favorites-Hong Kong and Singapore-remain as au-
thoritarian as ever; indeed they probably have slipped in recent years on 
any democratization index. 
This somewhat motely result is hardly surprising for anyone with a 
contingency, or even probabilistic, view of history. It certainly does not 
falsify the marketer's projections. But it has resulted in more modest 
and even guarded statements about historical outcomes. So Robert 
Barro has interestingly suggested that "freedom" and "personal rights" 
are "luxury goods" emerging as a side-product from personally "neces-
sary" liberties of the marketplace. Instead of a monotonic progression 
we are offered a more contingent possibility of a type recorded history 
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seems to project. Richard Posner has suggested an analogous develop-
ment: richer countries can afford a more elaborate and nuanced, and 
therefore freer, machinery for social control. 
X. GLOBALIZATION AND ITS PORTENTS 
The claims of globalization advocates at its apex amounted to yet 
another "end of history" thesis. Parochialism, local boundaries, obsta-
cles to a seamless international economy were to be swept aside, and 
would be replaced by an evermore prosperous world. 
The predicted efficiency would be a byproduct largely of two fac-
tors. There would be an intensification of the trend toward mobility of 
the factors of production and co-production of goods. Increasingly 
components of a product would be furbished or refurbished at the opti-
mal place for its creation, and the various sub-products brought to its fi-
nal assembly point, with transportation preplanned to be minimal. The 
absence of legal and minimization of physical barriers would permit the 
second factor to come to play. Economists had long argued that nations 
should produce what they could produce at the greatest comparative ef-
ficiency. Countries had evaded the import of this axiom, by tariff barri-
ers and other measures, which were objectively to their disadvantage 
and that of the world, though this reality was hidden from view. Glob-
alization would demonstrate that axioms, truth, and its implementation 
would be universally beneficial. 
Marxist and leftist theorists have seen the classical argument about 
sticking to comparative advantage as a way to keep disadvantaged na-
tions in their place. This was the explanation of the phenomenon of 
"imperialism" suggested by, inter alia, Lenin himself. Empires were 
seen as extractive enterprises designed to enrich the mother country. In 
fact, empires (including the Soviet one) have under analysis been shown 
to usually represent transfer of funds to the colonies. The mother coun-
try in effect buys and pays for political status by projecting itself as an 
international player in both the political and economic spheres. The 
truth of this was demonstrated by the British, French, ·. and Dutch deci-
sions in the aftermath of World War II to walk away from most of their 
empire. They decided they could not foot the bill. 
The rescue approach to "imperialism" was "dependencia" theory.20 
It argues that modem industrialism is an ever-productive system that 
moves societies to further development, by requiring expanding sub-
structure (e.g. roads, methods of transportation) and superstructure (e.g. 
20. See generally JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION (2004). 
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computerization, electronic tracking of goods, methods of research and 
retrieval). Agricultural production follows routine ruts and agricultural 
countries therefore fall further-and-further behind industrial societies. 
Dependent countries find themselves evermore depressed and back-
ward, since they do not need or create ancillary supportive economic 
structures. 
This interesting, even cogent, theory has the unusual fate in the so-
cial sciences of having been proved wrong. (Most social science is 
dismissed by e.g. physicists as "not even wrong.") Data from supplier 
countries in Latin America, the source of "dependencia" theory demon-
strated that infrastructure and institutions do develop around market 
movement of commodities, in quite comparable fashion to industrial 
goods. Roads, banks, futures markets, insurance, innovations, are all 
familiar to growers and distributors, and are comparable in their elabo-
ration to industrial proliferation. The means for independencia are 
there, in these ancillary economic developments. 
So the field has been left to the advocates and critics of globaliza-
tion. Stiglitz summarizes the critics, claiming the advocates ignore the 
asymmetries and timing of global betterment, and ignores its effect on 
human experience. This is in part because, as Stiglitz suggests, the in-
ternational system honors freedom of migration rather more in the 
breach than in the observance.21 Even in a relatively homogeneous so-
ciety uprooting oneself and family is harder for individuals then moving 
machinery or relocating A TMs. 
At the international level these issues are not merely exacerbated 
by distance or even oceans. Government and boundaries intervene, and 
"free trade" of persons remains much more a slogan than a reality. 
Even the European community has administered its free migration poli-
cies with noticeably less vigor than its drives against tariff and other 
trade barriers. In the real world, it is difficult to follow the job trail 
across borders unless one has specialized skill or is willing to live in the 
shadow of illegal immigration. Investment in humans is much more 
immobile under modem conditions than most other forms of capital. 
The dramatic increase in the mobility of capital in recent decades is 
the major background for this dilemma. The internet permits communi-
cation of a sort that is difficult for governments to control. International 
corporations use communication in rapid fashion to "transport" assets 
say, by changing accounting methods. Some countries have reasonably 
sophisticated methods for monitoring international corporations, but 
21. See generally JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002). 
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with the growing number of nation-states that subdivide year-by-year, 
many do not. 
Another asymmetry comes from the reality that nation-states affect 
international pricing through their power over import (and export) taxes 
and their subsidies to production and export; the fiction of free trade 
suggests all are working to eliminate these at the same, or approxi-
mately the same rate. But of course things are much more complex. 
Barriers and subsidies are increased with the left hand even as the inter-
national overt autarchic policies are cut with the opened right hand. 
XI. GLOBALIZATION AND LAW 
It has become almost a cliche to write about an incipient interna-
tional legal order. Certainly usual international law has been supple-
mented radically in the past half-century. But the pattern created is a 
peculiar patchwork that basically does not transcend the problematics of 
the system I studied in graduate school. To be sure almost all incipient 
legal systems are peculiar patchworks, but radical developments not 
clearly foreseeable today would have to occur to crystallize such tran-
scendence. 
Virtually all of "new legal order" conforms to the underlying real-
ity of the nation-state. The exceptions are the regional structures which 
may permit individual legal action. Clearly the European community 
which has full-blown legal recourse is in a drastically different realm of 
legalism than any of the other systems in which the states are the sub-
jects and individuals the "objects" of international law. 
At the same time the number of nation-states has grown at a sur-
prising pace. New states vastly outnumber those of pre-World War II. 
And the increase in such actors results in increased potential for varie-
gated behavior. 
The multiplication of national units raises many questions. In most 
instances these represent breakaways from old entities (usually federa-
tions) which have in our time been unstable: the Soviet Union, Czecho-
slovakia, and Yugoslavia have splintered. Bangladesh was to emerge 
from Pakistan and now faces possible secession. Kurds and Basque 
seek autonomous regions or independence. Africa has experienced the 
Ethiopian-Eritrean and other breakaways. And even Puerto Rico makes 
occasional separatist efforts. Those who see only amalgamation may 
tum a blind eye to an opposite and perhaps equal dynamic. 
Few of the new international institutions have the power to under-
take supra-national decision making on the one hand or sub-national en-
forcibility on the other. Those few cases where super-national decisions 
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are agreed to usually have grounds and machinery for opting out when 
national interest is deemed threatened. In most cases, there is no right 
of individuals to sue. In general, the U.N. machinery grinds out bureau-
cratic results, sometimes rule-based, but more usually ad hoc and exi-
gency-specific. 
An important, perhaps pregnant exception to the rule that global 
law is detoured through municipal law is the War Crimes Tribunal, an 
offshoot of the International Court of Justice, recently established by the 
U.N. Because its authority extends to alleged war criminals however 
seized and creates an absolute obligation of nations to tum over those 
accused, the U.S. has refused to participate. 
Greater hopes have attached to the financial organs of internation-
alism but perhaps this is based on misunderstanding. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank have almost completely oper-
ated on a non-legal exigent basis precisely because they have missions 
dealing with preserving funds and avoiding financial missteps for them-
selves and their client nations. Their austere, remote policy dominant 
experts sought to minimize accountability and symbolize not a desire 
for a legal order, but one of policy determination by those who know 
best. There is much and understandable discussion in the EU of "a de-
mocracy deficit," but the Fund and Bank suffer from an autocracy-
superiority-complex-surplus. 
WTO succeeded to GA TT, which was a proto-organization cen-
tered around periodic meetings-"rounds"-which produced agree-
ments resulting in tariff reductions. Violations (or alleged violations) 
triggered jawboning between signature nations who disagreed. A skele-
ton staff sometimes intervened, but even the rules to judge conflicts 
were a secret. WTO made a great leap forward with published rules, an 
established organization, and panels of experts making findings. 
The determination of a violation-a forbidden subsidy, or an out-
lawed tariff, permitted the discriminating country to get even by enact-
ing measures that were proportional to the damage, if the offending 
country refused to modify its behavior. So a good deal of lag time is 
inherently built into the system. Bad behavior by nation A has to occur 
and be perceived. Nation B tells nation A to mend its ways. They in-
teract often trading A's grievance on matter X, for B's complaints about 
Y. If they are unable to agree an official complaint may be filed and a 
determination made. When a complaint is upheld negotiations usually 
occur again. If unsuccessful, then A may announce a set of retaliatory 
tariffs and B has to decide to modify its behavior, accept the counter-
tariffs, or challenge them as excessive given the findings of the original 
damage. Given this process of several years length, complaints often 
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dissipate with changed economic or political conditions permitting a 
resolution. 
While WTO provisions are by the arcane methods of international 
law rather more law-like than the average, it is far from a juridical re-
gime. It is analogous to a domestic order in which a tribunal decides 
whether the Hatfield's are entitled to go after the McCoy's, and whether 
they exceeded the approved quota. More importantly it does not seem 
to free itself from national setting of rules, or from national implementa-
tion. 
The counterweight to national power throughout these systems is 
not in fact an internationalist perspective or world attitudes; perhaps we 
are at too early a point in the process for that. Rather, it is to introduce 
"expert," "objective," or conversely, "clearly erroneous and therefore 
improper" standards which limit and constrain governments from acting 
on perceived self-interest of the nation-state, or worse yet, of those in 
charge of the machinery of the nation-state. 
Perhaps the purest form of claim to objectivity and expertise is ex-
pressed in the form of standards. Standards are prescriptive specifica-
tions for products, goods or service and can be promulgated by govern-
ments, associations or even individuals.22 Sometimes the products of 
the leading entity in a sector become the yardstick, a standard as it were 
by default. Penalties for not measuring up also are varied, ranging from 
a right to refuse delivery, a lower price or damages, all the way to con-
fiscation or when the non-confirming product is deemed dangerous, 
criminal sanctions. 
Standards are versatile and can be not just assurances of quality, 
but also of indications of appropriate use pricing and safety. While the 
primary beneficiaries of standardization are consumers; governments or 
trade associations can protect society both with respect to ultimate us-
age and distribution, but also as to the basics of a product's manufac-
ture, assembly, or development. 
The most important entities in this arena are the national standard 
setters, institutionalized by most governments in imitation of the Ger-
man and British pioneering efforts mostly at the tum of the twentieth 
century. In the United States and most countries there are ancillary 
governmental, quasi-governmental and private standardizers. In the 
U.S. the system is largely "voluntary," but it is much more uniform than 
implied by that term, since failure to meet standards has severe conse-
22. See generally SAMUEL KRISLOV, How NATIONS CHOOSE PRODUCT STANDARDS AND 
STANDARDS CHANGE NATIONS (Pittsburgh Univ. Press 1997). 
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quences in obtaining insurance reimbursement, or in litigation, if some-
thing goes wrong. 
Standards are especially useful in international commerce, helping 
bridge social differences and commercial argot and custom, by provid-
ing very specific information. But as boundaries are crossed, govern-
ments have maximum opportunity, to bring into play protectionism dis-
guised as health and safety. Foreign beef is "prone" to hoof-and-mouth 
disease, local stomachs are different from (and more sensitive than) 
those of other countries, local housing regimes need more protection 
from fire, and labor conditions are different. 
The move toward globalization has gone hand-in-hand with efforts 
to objectify standards and eliminate tax-and-non-tax barriers to trade. 
The European Community is premised on tackling such issues and has 
been far more successful in that regard than in dealing with human 
rights, migration, or the creation of a European political order. (A mas-
terful example was the resolution of the European Court in dealing with 
different countries' rates on wine, beer, and whiskey and favoring its 
homegrown products. The court decided alcoholic content was to be 
the measure.) 
At the international level progress is much slower since it is usu-
ally worked out, step-by-step, in bilateral or multilateral agreements. 
But the major industrial countries and the WTO have also agreed on 
some modalities-standards about standards so to speak. One for ex-
ample, is the insistence on performance standards over design stan-
dards-how much a crane can safely hoist, rather than created from say, 
an alloy, made only in the regulating country, or forbidding, say plastic 
parts. 
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO), an inter-
national body, was not a major player in the field, until it invented the 
ISO 9000 services, and the process of self-certification a wildly success-
ful program. This success of the ISO is a result of its imaginative reali-
zation than many products and services are not regulated and would 
benefit from an individualized validation of its consistency. It has little 
or nothing to do with ISO's international status. For virtually all stan-
dard developers and users a national standard authorized by a leading 
organization, especially American National Standards Institute (ANSI), 
maximizes access to a national market and has at least equal clout, 
compared to ISO, in other countries. 
In a sense, the continued nationally-based standards structure, the 
lack of true significance of any true internationalization is something of 
a paradigm for globalism. The world grows closer because it acknowl-
edges American, German, European and Japanese models. 
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Globalization thinkers emphasize the legal intertwining of eco-
nomic transactions as ultimately creating new realities. Historically 
they have not prevented wars between nations that are trading partners, 
nor the disintegration of societies with economic bounds. The most 
promising developments toward a new international community seem to 
me to lie elsewhere in political sub-institutions that have little or noth-
ing to do with markets. 
One is the EC requirement that member-states maintain a democ-
ratic structure and adhere to human rights defined in part by the Stras-
bourg Convention of Human Rights and legally cognizable in EC as 
well as member-state courts. As we know many such assurances have 
been made by totalitarian states and their violations have been blinked 
at by their supposed fellow guarantors. In the case of the EC it is clear 
member-states believe the requirements will be enforced and some 
countries-Greece and Spain come quickly to mind, as well as former 
Soviet satellites-were as eager to join to buttress internal democracy as 
well as to gain economic advantage. 
The second development has been the fostering by the UN of the 
network of NGO's. This has the potential of being the UN's greatest 
contribution. Of varying influence, NGO's link representatives of many 
and many groups, particularly the unpowerful and otherwise poorly rep-
resented, throughout the world. They have a greater interest, a more 
general motive to support, the spread of law and liberty, than the more 
focused economic groups with quite specific expectations. NGO's may 
indeed provide the underpinnings of a great leap forward in internation-
alism. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The assumption that markets shape law, and in some sense are its 
rock-bed has also been reified into a historical rule that trade precedes 
law. This is at best problematic. States, tribes, and other political enti-
ties have also molded and controlled trade. Economic organizations 
historically do not suddenly grow political tentacles. The famous 
"counterexample"-that of the Hansa the merchants that created a legal 
order, has been shown to be extensions of the merchant's home city-
states-that is agents of a polity. 
Finally there is considerable fuzziness about the relationship of law 
and freedom. Smith's "natural liberty" included many elements of lais-
sez faire which others have considered essential to a structured market 
legal order. The fact that many classicists consider Hong Kong and 
Singapore the leading exemplars of free and legal markets when they 
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are high on any list of constricted societies begs the question of how 
"liberty" emerges from markets. The current conclusion that such de-
velopment is possible, but not entrained seems powerfully supported. 
This probabilistic approach has renewed the neo-classical approach 
to democratic development, particularly with its Frank-Knight-Chicago-
school recognition of market weaknesses. The imperfect market is like 
Churchill's characterization of democracy, better than its rivals, and 
takes unbearable decision-making from the shoulders of the political 
system. This permits political intervention where necessary and gives 
breathing space to a tolerant and possibly democratic order. 
The Marxist attitudes toward markets and freedom are in disarray. 
Marx's contempt for efficiency and law helped deny Eastern Europe 
both of those qualities and thwart democratic freedom. 
On the other hand, democratic socialism and the welfare state have 
survived a crisis of confidence with modest adjustments. After consid-
erable privatization of industries and some trimming of benefits, conti-
nental welfare systems have proven politically and economically resil-
ient and retained their legal traditions in full vigor. 
The Sociological tradition of the nineteenth century suggested that 
growing involvement required increased law. This would be con-
strained by diverse elements of overlapping societies to be an efficient 
compromise of industrial methods, legal instrumentalities, and traditions 
of freedom. Its contemporary heir is the globalization approach, which 
because of its economic garb has more precision and a less Pollyannaish 
aura about it. The Kantian-like dreams of perpetual peace, and "the 
brotherhood of man," had millenarist smugness about it, a pan-Unitarian 
expectation that good would triumph because it was good. While early 
writers on globalization suggested an increase of law and efficiency, 
would homogenize "freedom" in a costless way, today's globalists see a 
rockier road. Still they seem to project much the same ends. But they 
do not accept the pattern of simple stages or simple convergence theo-
ries, stressing instead contingencies and various byways with diverse 
meltings of social evolution and considerable retention of diversity and 
traditions. 
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